This paper proposes a framework to analyze competition in the banking sector using Jordan as an example. In particular, the paper pursues a multi-pronged approach to analyze competition including (i) an examination of the extent to which the market is contestable (i.e., has low barriers to bank entry and exit), (b) an evaluation of the behavior of bank spreads, and (iii) an assessment of non-structural and direct measures of bank competition such as the H-statistic and the Lerner Index. This approach provides a more comprehensive framework to examine competition in the banking sector, compared to the commonly used alternative of looking only at bank concentration figures. In the case of Jordan, the analysis indicates that while concentration has declined, competition in the country is low and has decreased over time.
1.

Introduction
The Jordanian banking sector is concentrated. The share of assets held by the three largest banks is close to 70 percent when we take into account the global assets of Jordanian banks.
1 Though concentration levels have come down recently, they still exceed that of many countries in the region (Table 1) . However, concentration is not equivalent to competition (see Jackson, 1992 and Cetorelli, 1999) , since contestable sectors where barriers to entry and exit are low can remain competitive. As a result an analysis of bank competition in Jordan requires a more comprehensive framework.
This paper proposes a multi-pronged approach to examine the extent of competition in the banking sector. The framework is applied to Jordan but can be used to analyze bank competition in any country. 2 First, the paper examines banking sector contestability by looking into the licensing procedures and practices, the capital requirements, and the regulations affecting bank activities and transparency. As part of evaluating contestability, the paper also examines the experience with bank exit. Second, the paper analyses the behavior of bank spreads -the difference between lending and deposit rates, a measure of the cost of financial intermediation and a frequently used indicator of efficiency and bank competition. Third, the paper computes the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic, a non-structural and more direct measure of competition, which captures the elasticity of interest revenues with respect to input prices. As a robustness check, the paper also presents estimates of the degree of market power in the Jordanian banking sector by reporting the Lerner Index, defined as the difference between output prices and marginal costs relative to prices.
The analysis shows that bank competition in Jordan is low and has decreased in recent years. The current concentrated market structure and the lack of contestability in the Jordanian banking sector appear to explain the low level of competition.
1 It is worthwhile to consider concentration based on global assets, because the global activity of some banks can give them a comparative advantage and, hence, increase their market power at home as a result. 2 In fact, other studies have used this framework to analyze competition in Russia (Anzoategui, Martinez Peria, and Melecky, 2010) , in China (Demirguc-Kunt, Martinez Peria, and Merrouche, 2010) and to compare banking sector competition in the Middle East and Northern Africa Region to that in other regions (Anzoategui, Martinez Peria, and Rocha, 2010) .
Assessing Banking Sector Contestability
A market is contestable when barriers to bank entry and exit are low. The threat of bank entry and exit can exert pressure on incumbent banks and keep the sector competitive even if banking sector concentration is high. By facilitating bank entry and operations and by promoting transparency, the regulatory framework practices can have a significant impact on banking sector contestability and competition. Regulations that enable bank entry and operations and foster bank disclosure can bring greater contestability to the banking sector and promote competition.
Hence, an analysis of competition in the banking sector requires a close examination of the regulations regarding bank entry and transparency in the banking sector. At the same time, it is important to analyze how regulations are implemented in practice since even if de jure barriers to entry and exit appear not to be very restrictive, regulators can limit entry and exit de facto. Table 2 . Furthermore, the initial capital requirements in Jordan far exceed those in other countries with similar or higher levels of financial development, where they average 5 to 10 million U.S. dollars.
To obtain a banking license, banks in Jordan need to present information on or submit the following: (1) draft by-laws, (2) the intended organization chart, (3) financial projections for the first three years, (4) financial information on the main potential shareholders, (5) background/experience of future directors, (6) background/experience of future managers,
sources of funds to be disbursed in the capitalization of new bank, and (8) Jordan is not the exception in this regard. Among the neighboring countries listed in Table 2, only Israel publishes bank level information in its central bank website.
In terms of bank exit practices, Jordan does not have a track record of closing many troubled banks, hence the lack of threat of exit can limit competition. Though Jordan has established a Prompt Correct Action framework), the banking authorities have been largely reluctant to close banks. Banks have either been merged with public assistance or have been allowed to continue to operate (see Table 3 ).
Overall, while bank entry regulations in Jordan are similar to those observed in other countries, banking sector contestability seems to be limited because the system is characterized by low entry and exit in practice.
Analyzing Bank Spreads
The banking literature has often used bank spreads (the difference between contractual lending and deposit rates) and ex-post interest margins (measured as interest income minus expenses relative to bank assets) as indicators of banking efficiency and competition. 4 Higher spreads and margins are often interpreted to signal greater inefficiencies and lack of competition in the banking sector.
Ex-ante average interest rate spreads in Jordan have declined in the last decade (from 4.8 percent to 3.2 percent), but they exceed those for neighboring countries such as Israel and
Lebanon (see Figure 2 ). Furthermore, distinguishing between the spreads on the prime rate charged to the best bank borrowers (large corporations) and the average rates on all lending instruments indicates that the spreads charged to non-prime borrowers can be higher than those reported in Figure 2 (see Table 4 ). While the spread on prime borrowers is 2.6 percent, the spread on all loan and advances is 4.2 percent, the spread on overdraft facilities is 3.3 percent and the one on discounted bills and bonds is 3.9 percent. Though no information is available from the Central bank of Jordan on the spreads on corporate vis-à-vis SME and retail lending, anecdotal evidence suggests that spreads on SMEs and retail clients range between 3 and 4 percent. The average spreads tend to be closer to the prime rate because close to 50 percent of all Table 5 ).
Computing a Direct Measure of Competition in the Banking Sector
Looking only at spreads can be problematic since spread can reflect countries" macroperformance, the extent of taxation of financial intermediation, the quality of the contractual and judicial environment, and bank-specific factors such as scale and risk preferences. The recent banking literature analyzes more direct measures of competition based on models of industrial organization that emphasize market contestability. A large number of studies have focused on measuring bank competition via the Rosse (1982, 1987) Hstatistic, which captures the elasticity of bank interest revenues to input prices. 5 Under perfect competition, an increase in input prices raises both marginal costs and total revenues by the same amount and, hence, the H-statistic will equal 1. Under a monopoly, an increase in input prices results in a rise in marginal costs, a fall in output, and a decline in revenues leading to an Hstatistic less than or equal to 0. Panzar and Rosse (1987) show that when H is between 0 and 1 the system operates under monopolistic competition. In general, the H-statistic is interpreted as a measure of the degree of competition in the banking market. The H-statistic is only valid if the market is in long-run equilibrium (if return on bank assets is not related to input prices).
Based on the Rosse (1982, 1987) methodology and following the empirical strategy pursued by Claessen and Laeven (2004) , the H-statistic is calculated by estimating equation (1):
where i denotes banks and t denotes years. P is the ratio of gross interest revenues to total assets (proxy for the output price of loans), W 1 is the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money market funding (proxy for input price of deposits), W 2 is the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets (proxy for input price of labor) and W 3 is the ratio of other operating and administrative expenses to total assets (proxy for input price of equipment/fixed capital). Z is a matrix of controls including the ratio of equity to total assets, the ratio of net loans to total assets, and the logarithm of assets (to control for bank size effects). D is a vector of year dummies.
Finally, α i denote bank-level fixed effects.
1 The H-statistic equals β 1 + β 2 + β 3.
To verify the condition of long-run equilibrium, the following regression is estimated:
Ln(ROA it )= α i + β 1 ln(W 1,it ) + β 2 ln(W 2,it ) + β 3 ln(W 3,it ) + γ ln(Z ,it ) + δD + ε it (2) where ROA is the pre-tax return on assets. Because ROA can take on negative values, we compute the dependent variable as ln(1+ROA). We define the equilibrium E-statistic as β 1 + β 2 + β 3 from equation (2). The test of long-run equilibrium involves testing whether E=0.
We calculate the H-statistic for Jordan over three periods. Using Bankscope data, we The Jordanian banking sector appears to be less competitive than that of most comparator countries. 6 In particular, the H-statistics for Israel, Lebanon, and Morocco exceeds those obtained for Jordan both during the most recent period and over the entire 1994-2006 period (see Table 6 ). Furthermore, a cross-country analysis, detailed below, including 91 countries (67 of which are developing), reveals that the H-statistic for Jordan is below the 0.52 average across all countries and the 0.55 average obtained across developing economies.
To identify the factors that explain differences in the H-statistic for Jordan vis-à-vis other countries, we estimate equation (3):
where i is the country identifier, Z is a matrix of country characteristics discussed below, and u is the error term. We estimate equation (3) for 91 countries around the world using Bankscope data for the period 1994-2006 (see Table 7 ). The idea is to use the parameters from this estimation to determine the factors that explain the degree of competition in Jordan vis-à-vis other countries.
In particular, we hope to compare Jordan to: (i) all other countries, (ii) all other developing countries, and (iii) a group of non-oil producing neighboring countries plus the Eastern European countries with similar GDP per capita.
Following Claessens and Laeven (2004) , we include as regressors variables that capture countries" market structure, contestability, macroeconomic conditions, and general level of development. Furthermore, we also include variables that capture the extent of transparency in the system. In particular, as indicators of market structure, we include the concentration ratio (defined as the share of assets held by the five largest banks), the number of banks per population, the share of assets owned by government banks, and the share of assets owned by foreign banks. To capture market contestability, we include the number of documents or procedures required to obtain a banking license, the fraction of applications for bank licenses denied, and an index of the extent of restrictions on bank activities. We also include the log of the minimum capital required to open a bank and the capital adequacy ratio, since high capital requirements are likely to deter entry. We include an index of bank auditing requirements and an index of bank disclosure requirements as measures of bank transparency. All the variables discussed so far come from the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) database. We control for the impact of macroeconomic conditions by including the inflation rate and the real GDP growth.
These variables come from the World Development Indicators. As measures of institutional development, we include GDP per capita from the World Development Indicators and, alternatively, an index of property rights from the Heritage Foundation.
To examine the factors that are most influential in explaining differences in the Hstatistics between Jordan and other countries, we multiply the coefficients from Table 7 by the difference between the values for Jordan and the mean for (i) all other countries, (ii) all other developing countries, and (iii) the group of comparator countries (primarily other non-oil producing countries in the Middle East) to determine the factors that explain the difference in Hstatistic. The results are found in Table 8 .
The current concentrated market structure and the lack of contestability in the Jordanian banking sector appear to explain the low H-statistic. Table 8 reveals that among the variables that we found to have a significant impact on the H-statistic, the level of concentration is the most important in explaining the observed difference in H-statistics between Jordan and other countries. Other variables that are also important are the share of applications denied, the initial minimum capital, the capital asset ratio, and the index of bank auditing.
Measuring Market Power
An alternative way to examine competition in banking is to compute direct measures of market power, since greater market power implies less competition. 7 A frequently used measure of market power in banking is the Lerner index, defined as the difference between output prices and marginal costs (relative to prices). The advantage of the Lerner Index, vis-à-vis the H-statistic, is that it is not a long-run equilibrium measure of competition. Also, because of this, the Lerner index can be calculated at each point in time.
The Lerner Index is computed using the formula (P-MC)/P, where P is the price of banking outputs and MC is the marginal costs. Following the approach in Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2005 and Berger et al. (2008) , who proxy banking production by total assets, P is calculated as total bank revenue over assets and MC is calculated by taking the derivative from a translog cost function as specified in equation (4) (4) where i denotes banks and t denotes years. C is total operating plus financial costs, Q is total assets, W 1 is the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money market funding (proxy for input price of deposits), W 2 is the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets (proxy for input price of labor) and W 3 is the ratio of other operating and administrative expenses to total assets (proxy for input price of equipment/fixed capital). We also include a trend to capture the influence of technical change leading to shifts in the cost function over time. As in most papers, the estimation is done under the restrictions of symmetry and degree one homogeneity in the price of inputs. However, our results do not change if we drop these constraints.
The 
Conclusions
The banking sector in Jordan is concentrated. However, the link between concentration and competition is not always clear. Hence, an analysis of competition in the banking sector requires a broader framework. This paper proposes a framework for analyzing competition which includes looking at banking sector contestability, banking sector spreads as well as analyzing non-structural measures of competition.
Aside from being concentrated, the Jordanian banking sector exhibits other characteristics that suggest that the levels of competition and contestability can be improved.
Capital requirements are high and entry has in practice been restricted by the Central Bank. The system also lacks a fully-developed and tested exit framework that encourages competition.
Relatively high spreads, low interest revenue elasticities to input prices, and high values of the Lerner Index of market power are also indicative of low levels of competition in Jordan.
Though this paper focused on the case of Jordan, the framework presented can be used to assess bank competition systematically in operational work and can provide an analytical base to provide more informed guidance on policies related to bank competition and contestability in other countries as well. 45 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
